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PATENTS: SUPREME COURT HOLDS POST-EXPIRATION
ROYALTY AGREEMENTS UNLAWFUL PER SE
A PATENT confers upon the patentee the exclusive right to preclude
others from making, using or selling the invention embodied in the
patent for a term of seventeen years.1 The patentee, however, may
grant to others the right to make, use and/or sell; 2 he usually does
so through licensing agreements which exact royalties for those
rights. This practice has been limited by the United States Supreme
Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,3 which held that "use of a royalty
agreement that projects beyond the expiration of the patent is un-
lawful per se."'4
The plaintiff in Brulotte owned various patents for hop-picking,
and sold machines embodying many of those patents pursuant to
sale and license agreements. These agreements passed "title" to the
machines at a flat sum, and licensed their use in return for royalties
computed either on the basis of a fixed sum per hop-picking season
or a fixed rate per unit of hops picked, whichever was greater. The
licenses were to extend for a term of seventeen years and further
required that the licensee not assign his interest or remove the ma-
chine from the county of sale without the permission of the licensor.
Defendants Brulotte and Charvet were obligated under the licenses
to pay royalties through the 1958 and 1960 harvest seasons re-
spectively. Only seven of the twelve patents listed in the licenses
were incorporated into the machines; those seven patents all expired
on or before 1957. The other five patents, which were for improve-
ment devices available for use but not actually used on defendants'
machines, expired on or before 1960.i
When the defendants refused to pay royalties accruing after
1952, the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the Washington state
courts. The supreme court of that state affirmed, holding that a
"See Patent Code of 1952, § 154, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). The Patent Code imple-
ments U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See generally ANDUR, PATENT LAW AND PRACrIcE (1935);
STEDMAN, PATENTS (1939); WALKER, PATENTS (Deller ed. 1937, Supp. 1964).
2 See, e.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873).
3 379 U.S. 29 (1964), petitions for rehearing and for clarification denied, 379 U.S.
985 (1965).
4 Id. at 32.
5 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-6; Brief for Petitioners, pp.
2-9; Brief for Respondent, pp. 1-6.
seventeen-year period was a reasonable amount of time over which
to spread payments for the use of a patent." The Supreme Court
reversed, disallowing royalties accruing after 1957, the date of ex-
piration for the most recent patent actually used in the machines.7
The enforceability of royalty agreements extending beyond the
expiration date of a patent has had a history of uncertainty. Be-
ginning in 1901, a series of decisions in the Second Circuit an-
nounced in dictum the rule that royalties may not accrue after
expiration except when parties expressly contract to the countrary8
This rule was perpetuated by lower federal court and state supreme
court decisions," and in only a few of those decisions did the royalty
agreements fall within the contractual exception. 10 The rule had
been adopted unequivocally by all treatises"1 dealing with the sub-
ject, and it seems clear that it has been relied upon often by parties
preparing royalty agreements.' 2
Simultaneous with the development of the rule permitting ex-
press post-expiration royalty agreements, however, has been the
evolution of the doctrine of patent misuse. That doctrine, sup-
posedly the patent equivalent of the equitable rule of "unclean
hands,"'13 denies judicial relief to a patentee who engages in activity
6 Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 382 P.2d 271 (1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 29
(1964).
" 379 U.S. at 30.
8 E. R. Squibb 8 Sons v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 93 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir.
1937) (dictum); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 270 Fed. 518, 525 (2d Cir.
1920) (dictum); Sproull v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 108 Fed. 963, 965 (2d Cir. 1901) (dic-
tum).
0 See, e.g., Tate v. Lewis, 127 F. Supp. 105 (D. Mass. 1954); H-P-M Dev. Corp. v.
Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906 (D.N.J. 1947); Six Star Lubricants Co. v. More-
house, 101 Colo. 391, 74 P.2d 1239 (1937); McLeod v. Crawford, 176 Neb. 513, 126
N.W.2d 663 (1964).
10 Well Surveys, Inc. v. McCullough Tool Co., 199 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Okla. 1961),
arfd, 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Dyer, 129 Cal. App. 2d 160, 276 P.2d 186
(1954); Six Star Lubicants Co. v. Morehouse, supra note 9; McLeod v. Crawford,
supra note 9.
II See, e.g., 69 C.J.S. PATENTS §§ 252, 262 (1951); ELLIS, PATENT LICENSES § 109 (2d
ed. 1958).
12 This is suggested, for example, by the Brief for Wells Surveys, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
23 Although the patent misuse doctrine has often been characterized as correspondent
to the equitable defense of "unclean hands," it has broader implications in terms of
its concern for the public interest. The equitable defense is normally applied to
situations where the plaintiff has dealt unjustly in the transaction of which he com-
plains. In contrast, the misuse doctrine may be applicable regardless of whether the
particular defendant has suffered from the patent misuse-the adverse effect upon
the public interest, resulting from the plaintiff's conduct, disqualifies him to maintain
the suit. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942).
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which extends beyond the scope of his patent monopoly.14 Typical
of such proscribed activity are tie-ins, 15 price fixing,"' exclusive
dealerships,' 7 restrictions on the use of competitive products and
processes,' 8 and discriminatory pricing.' 9 Most commonly, the
doctrine operates to bar a patentee from maintaining an action for
patent infringement,20 but it may also render unenforceable license
agreements containing provisions constituting misuse.21
The possibility that post-expiration royalty agreements would
constitute patent misuse was first implied in Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co. 22  In that case, the Supreme Court held that
any attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those
claiming under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent
expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the
policy and purpose of the patent laws.23
After Scott Paper, several lower courts questioned the validity of the
rule allowing post-expiration royalties, 24 and in 1959 the Third
Circuit specifically repudiated it in two cases.26 Despite these
1 See Nordhaus, Antitrust Laws and Public Policy, 3 DuQUESNE U.L. Rxv. 1-2
(1964).
1r See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
26 See, e.g., Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir.
1956).
17See, e.g., F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equip. Corp., 194 F.2d 592 (7th Cir.
1952) (dictum). This decision has been criticized in U.S. Arr'y GEN., NATIONAL
CoAmn-rEE TO STUDy THE ANTITRUST LAws 251 (1955).
" See, e.g., National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d
Cir. 1943).
'
9 See, e.g., Hardinge Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 164 F. Supp. 75 (W.D.
Pa. 1958).
20 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). In the
absence of misuse by the patentee the patent infringer may be subject to civil action
for damages and injunction. Patent Code of 1952, §§283-84, 35 U.S.C. §§283-84
(1964).21 See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Lord, 28 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1928).
22 326 U.S. 249 (1945), 59 H~Av. L. RFv. 299.
23 326 U.S. at 256. (Emphasis added.)
24 See, e.g., Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550, 573 (4th Cir.
1950); Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655,
663-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); April Prods. Inc. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 878, 126
N.E2d 283, 287 (1955).
2
rAr-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962), 31
GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 535; American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d
769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959). In American Securit, a license agree-
ment was held invalid where a licensee was compelled to take a license for a package
of patents rather than for the single patent actually needed and used. Apart from
the mandatory package consideration, the court concluded that such an agreement
constituted patent misuse "for it extends the payment of royalties [for]... patents
which may expire to the expiration date of [the last patent granted]...." 268 F.2d at
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decisions, however, some conjecture persisted that a post expiration
royalty agreement might be justifiable as a convenient method of
payment if it was for a fixed and reasonable, rather than indefinite
term.26  Although Brulotte appears to have decided that question,
it has left in its wake several unresolved questions of importance
to a patentee.
First, the extent to which patent misuse will constitute an anti-
trust violation is left undefined by BrulotteY7 Although both mis-
use and antitrust violation were argued extensively by the parties, 28
the Court used neither term in its decision. Rather, the use of post-
expiration royalty agreements was characterized as unlawful per se.?
However, it analogized such use to the tie-in cases, 30 many of which
involve findings of antitrust violations.31 For this reason, Brulotte
seems to have left post-expiration royalty agreements vulnerable to
private antitrust actions, given the litigious incentive of treble
damages awarded in civil antitrust suits.3 2
Brulotte also raises the question of which post-expiration pay-
777. The Ar-Tik case similarly held that a license agreement which required the pay-
ment of royalties "regardless of the expiration of the patent" constituted patent misuse
and was unenforceable.
20 See, e.g., 31 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 535, 539 n.37 (1962).
27 "The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection
of the patent is measured by the antitrust laws not by patent law." Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944). From this statement
arose the speculation that patent misuse must always constitute an antitrust violation.
Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful Coexistence?, 54 MicH. L. REv. 199 n.1
(1955). However, the prevailing view is now to the contrary. See U.S. Arr'Y GEN.,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 254. See generally NoRDHAus AND JUROW, PATENT-ANTTrRUST
LAW (1961); Davis, Patent Licensing and the Anti-Trust Laws: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 46 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 12 (1964); Wood, Patents, Antitrust and Prima Facie
Attitudes, 50 VA. L. REV. 571 (1964).
-8 See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 24-28; Brief for Respondent, pp. 32-36. The United
States argued only that there had been patent misuse. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, pp. 6-18.
20 379 U.S. at 32. Justice Harlan's dissent construed the majority opinion as hold-
ing that Thys Co. had "unlawfully misused its patent monopoly," id. at 34, and in a
footnote suggested that there existed in the record no basis for finding an antitrust
violation. Id. at 38 n.3. The terminology of the majority opinion, however, is more
analogous to that used in the Court's antitrust, rather than patent misuse opinions.
For example, "per se" is a familiar antitrust term. U.S. ATr'Y GEN., op. cit. supra
note 17, at 12. Furthermore, an antitrust violation is "unlawful" or "illegal" whereas,
at least in common parlance, a finding of patent misuse is a bar to judicial relief
rather than a determination of unlawfulness. See quotation note 27 supra.
3O 379 U.S. at 33. Compare Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942).
3 E.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Interuational
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
32 Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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ments might be recoverable if provided for in some form other
than a separate licensing agreement. The United States, as amicus
curiae, conceded that there would have been no misuse if the
parties had agreed on a fixed price for the machines and spread
that sum over seventeen annual installments, 33 and the Court itself
acknowledged that the sale of an unpatented machine with long-
term payments based on use might be valid.3 4 The agreement in
Brulotte, however, was too bold an "attempt to exact the same
terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired
as they do for the monopoly period."8 5 Thus, although long-term
payments of a fixed price for a patented item, pursuant to a single
contract of sale, are ostensibly enforceable, any exaction of pay-
ments based on use extending for a term beyond expiration of the
patent will be unlawful "whatever the legal device employed."3'
In any event, patentees who license or sell with terms based on use
will now be compelled either to periodically incorporate improve-
ment patents into their products or to periodically restructure the
terms used in their licenses or sales.8 7
Brulotte is clearly a manifestation of the policy announced by
the Court in Scott Paper Co. that any extension of the patent
monopoly beyond the expiration date of the patent will not be
allowed.38 However, it would seem that the majority opinion has
been unnecessarily vague in its statement of both that policy and
the rule in regard to post-expiration royalties. Per se rules have
the advantage of clarity of notice, but the Court has heretofore im-
posed such rules only when it felt that a transaction of the type
involved could never be found to be reasonable. 9 Read literally,
33 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 14.
3,379 U.S. at 32.
3rIbid.
"6 379 U.S. at 31. The Court's concern is with the unequal leverage the patentee
holds over prospective users in bargaining. A fixed-price installment contract would
be more difficult to invalidate. Its form comports with the Court's concession that "a
patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the
leverage of [his] ... monopoly." Id. at 33. But post-expiration projection of pay-
ments based on use does violence to the approved form and is thus unlawful. Ibid.
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945).
37 Thus, the possible advantages of long-term payments based on use will be un-
available to those who purchase patented products near to but not after the expira-
tion of those patents.
"8 See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
"See, e.g., Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1959);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395-402 (1927).
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Brulotte could mean that many transactions which otherwise would
seem reasonable will be prohibited per se.40  Although the criterion
of unreasonableness may be subsequently incorporated into this
rule, few patentees will risk the nonenforceability of their license
agreements by relying on liberal interpretations of the decision.
Thus, the ambiguity in Brulotte, so long as it remains unresolved,
may greatly limit marketing methods avialable to them.
10 Long-term installment contracts for the purchase of machines containing viable
patents may, for example, be embraced under the literal ambit of Brulotte. Further,
purchase of machines in accordance with long-term payment provisions based on use
may be advantageous to the buyer as well as the patentee.
